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PREFACE
This re port pres ents in for ma tion on thecredit con straints that poor ru ral house -
holds face, de rived from de tailed ru ral house -
hold sur veys con ducted by IFPRI and its col -
labo ra tors in nine coun tries of Asia and Af rica 
(Bang la desh, Cam er oon, China, Egypt,
Ghana, Mada gas car, Ma lawi, Ne pal, and
Paki stan). It uses this in for ma tion to make
the case for ap pro pri ate pub lic in ter ven tion in 
strength en ing ru ral fi nan cial mar kets and
draws con clu sions about ar eas where pub lic
re sources may best be spent.  It de scribes
how in for mal, of ten in dige nous in sti tu tional
ar range ments—from sav ings clubs and lend -
ing net works to small re tail shops and in put
deal ers—have suc ceeded in tai lor ing sav -
ings, credit, and in sur ance serv ices to the
poor. What en ables in for mal in sti tu tions to
pro vide sus tain able fi nan cial serv ices that
banks and co op era tives in the for mal sec tor
in sti tu tions, with few ex cep tions, fail to pro -
vide?  What are their strengths and weak -
nesses?  What les sons can for mal sec tor
 institutions draw from them? The re port
 argues that the ba sic prob lem lies in in sti tu -
tional ar range ments, sum ma rily trans planted
from urban- based for mal bank ing sys tems,
that have  high trans ac tion costs for lend ers
and bor row ers alike. For the lender, these
costs are in curred in screen ing large num -
bers of bor row ers, moni tor ing and en forc ing
un se cured loan con tracts, and man ag ing tiny
sav ings de pos its.  For the bor rower, these
costs take the form of time and other re -
sources spent se cur ing loans or mak ing de -
pos its, or in ap pro pri ate de posit or loan terms. 
Fi nally, the re port looks at ex am ples of re cent 
in sti tu tional in no va tions that over come some
of these ob sta cles. It con cludes that just as
there is a role for the pub lic sec tor to de velop 
or sup port science- based tech nolo gies,
con certed pub lic ac tion is also needed to cre -
ate an ena bling en vi ron ment in which in sti tu -
tional in no va tion is en cour aged and given
more room to spread.  Gov ern ments, do nors, 
bank ing prac ti tio ners, non gov ern men tal or -
gani za tions, and re search in sti tu tions must
work to gether closely to pin point the costs,
bene fits, and fu ture po ten tial of emerg ing ru -
ral fi nan cial in sti tu tions.
The re port pres ents em piri cal re sults and
con clu sions from a mul ti coun try re search pro -
gram at IFPRI, that  be gan for mally in 1994.
Many IFPRI staff and col labo ra tors from
other re search and gov ern ment in sti tu tions
have di rectly or in di rectly con trib uted to the
coun try case study re search and syn the sis
work. Ro sanna Ag ble, Joachim von Braun,
Su mi ter Broca, Franz Heid hues, Eileen Ken -
nedy, Zhu Ling, So hail Malik, Char les Mataya,
Mo ham med Mush taq, El len Pay on gay ong,
Al ex an der Phiri, Zil lur Rah man, Ger trud
Schrie der, Sim towe, Ro setta Te tebo, Tshi -
kala Tshi baka, and Ji ang Zhong Yi all con -
trib uted.  We also thank Law rence Had dad
and Bon nie McClaf ferty for com ments, and
Phyl lis Skill man for ed it ing this manu script.
Fi nan cial sup port for the cross- country syn -
the sis of re sults was pro vided by the Min is try of 
Eco nomic Co op era tion and De vel op ment
(BMZ), Fed eral Re pub lic of Ger many and the
Ger man Agency for Tech ni cal Co op era tion
(GTZ). The in di vid ual coun try stud ies were sup -
ported by the fol low ing do nor agen cies: Bang la -
desh, Cam er oon, China, and Mada gas car
(BMZ and GTZ), Egypt and Paki stan (U.S.
Agency for In ter na tional De vel op ment
[USAID]), Ma lawi (UNICEF, The Rocke fel ler
Foun da tion, GTZ, USAID, and since 1998, Irish 
Aid), Ghana (USAID), and Ne pal (USAID, Win -
rock In ter na tional, GTZ, and In ter na tional De -
vel op ment Re search Cen tre).
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INTRODUCTION
The myth that poor house holds in de vel -op ing coun tries, who of ten earn less
than a dol lar a day, are not cred it wor thy or
able to save has been firmly put to rest in re -
cent years. Poor house holds, it has been
found, place spe cial value on re li able and
con tin ued ac cess to dif fer ent types of fi nan -
cial serv ices, avail able at rea son able cost
and ca ter ing to their spe cific needs. Credit
and sav ings fa cili ties can help poor ru ral
house holds man age and of ten aug ment their
oth er wise mea ger re sources and ac quire
ade quate food and other ba sic ne ces si ties for 
their fami lies. Credit fa cili ties en able them to
tap fi nan cial re sources be yond their own and
take ad van tage of po ten tially prof it able in -
vest ment  opportunities. Well- managed sav -
ings fa cili ties pro vide in cen tives for house -
holds to build up funds for in vest ment or
fu ture con sump tion. Credit and sav ings fa cili -
ties en able farm ers to in vest in land im prove -
ments or ag ri cul tural tech nol ogy such as
high- yielding seeds and min eral fer til iz ers
that in crease in comes (while sus tain ing the
natu ral re source base). For ru ral house holds
who do not own land, credit and sav ings fa -
cili ties can help es tab lish or ex pand fam ily
en ter prises, po ten tially mak ing the dif fer ence
be tween grind ing pov erty and an eco nomi -
cally se cure life. Short- term bor row ing or sav -
ings are of ten used to main tain con sump tion
of ba sic ne ces si ties when house hold in comes
de cline tem po rar ily— after a bad har vest or be -
tween ag ri cul tural sea sons, for ex am ple. 
The task of pro vid ing fi nan cial serv ices at
a rea son able cost to those who have lim ited
as sets has not been easy, how ever. Un til the
1980s in many de vel op ing coun tries, state-
 run ag ri cul tural de vel op ment banks took the
lead in es tab lish ing for mal credit mar kets in
ru ral ar eas. How ever, the short com ings of
the bank ing prin ci ples that they were based
on—col lat er al ized lend ing, an or gan iza tional
setup with out any in cen tives to do busi ness
with the poor, ex ces sive de pend ence on gov -
ern ment fund ing, and per va sive po liti cal
 patronage—se verely handi capped their per -
form ance. The pro vi sion of sav ings serv ices
was also largely ne glected be cause the im -
por tance of pro vid ing de posit serv ices to the
poor was not ap pre ci ated and be cause do nor 
fi nance was avail able on at trac tive terms.
Dis trib ut ing loans at sub si dized in ter est rates
was em pha sized. And it was all too easy for
the so cially pow er ful and the wealthy to pre -
empt most of the bene fits of the sub si dized
dis tri bu tion of credit. Moreo ver, in some
coun tries, po liti cal lead ers found it to their ad -
van tage to re sist any moves to col lect long-
 outstanding debts from sub sidy re cipi ents,
and in many cases lead ers pe ri odi cally an -
nounced loan am nesty or in ter est re mis sion
pro grams in or der to at tain po liti cal ob jec -
tives. These types of ac tions greatly eroded
bor rower dis ci pline and loan ar rears bal -
looned. Not only did the banks fail to serve
the poor who were un able to pledge col lat -
eral, they also be came chroni cally de pend ent 
on larger and larger in fu sions of sub sidy
money, quickly slid ing be yond any pros pect
of long- term fi nan cial sus tain abil ity. Many of
them, in ef fect, de gen er ated to costly and
 inequitable in come trans fer pro grams.
In the past 15 years, sup port for state-
 sponsored ag ri cul tural banks has greatly
 declined, and the need for fi nan cial mar ket
re forms to rec tify dis tor tions caused by past
gov ern ment poli cies is now al most uni ver -
sally ac knowl edged. How ever, gov ern ments,
do nors, and non gov ern men tal or gani za tions
(NGOs) con tinue to look for al ter na tive mod -
els for ex tend ing fi nan cial serv ices to the
 rural poor in an ef fec tive and eco nomi cally
sus tain able way. Typi cal ques tions asked are 
what types of fi nan cial serv ices are de -
manded by the poor? How does ac cess to
credit af fect the wel fare of the poor? How can 
ru ral fi nan cial in sti tu tions more ef fec tively
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re duce pov erty? What kinds of in no va tions in
in sti tu tional de sign are called for and how
can they be gen er ated? What is the role of
gov ern ment in this pro cess? The so lu tions
pro posed in an swer to these ques tions are
of ten con fus ing and con flict ing, fre quently the 
re sult of tak ing ex treme po si tions on some is -
sues or gen er al iz ing from a nar row con text.
This re port at tempts to pro vide a bal anced
dis cus sion of the un der ly ing is sues, giv ing
due at ten tion to com pet ing claims and points
of view.
CLIENT PROFILE 
Suc cess ful pro vi sion of fi nan cial serv ices to the poor re quires a clear pic ture of who
the “poor” are. But gen er ali za tions are hard
to make. Con di tions of the poor in Latin
Amer ica or Cen tral Asia are quite dif fer ent
from those in South Asia or Af rica. Hence,
the na ture of the con straints and the best ap -
proach for tack ling them de pend on the char -
ac ter is tics of the tar get popu la tion. Ap -
proaches that work in one re gion may not be
read ily trans planted to an other, and serv ices
that suc cess fully ad dress the de mand of one
type of cli en tele—poor ag ri cul tural trad ers,
for ex am ple—may fail to ad dress those of an -
other type—semisub sis tence farm ers in the
same re gion. In ade quate un der stand ing of
the con di tions of the cli ent popu la tion or the
con text within which pol icy de ci sions are
made of ten leads to ten sion among poli cy -
mak ers,  donors, and man ag ers about what is 
the best way to sup port fi nan cial serv ices for
the poor. With this in mind, some ma jor char -
ac ter is tics of the poor and their par tici pa tion
in for mal and in for mal fi nan cial mar kets in ru -
ral ar eas of Af rica and Asia are iden ti fied
here. The data for the analy sis are de rived
from nine house hold sur veys con ducted by
IFPRI, that col lected de tailed data on credit
mar ket par tici pa tion.1 Here the fo cus of the
in ter coun try com pari sons is not so much the
na ture of credit trans ac tions them selves (as
con di tions among coun tries vary greatly), but
the dif fer ences be tween the poor and the
non poor within coun tries. The “poor” are de -
fined here as the bot tom one- fourth of the
sam ple house holds when ranked by per cap -
ita house hold in come lev els.
The ex tremely lim ited re source base of the
poor in Asia and Af rica is evi dent in Ta ble 1.
The ma jor ity of the poor lack ba sic edu ca tion,
are pri mar ily de pend ent on ag ri cul ture for their
live li hood, own ex tremely small amounts of
land for cul ti va tion, and sup port large fami lies at 
low av er age per cap ita in come lev els. Fur ther,
since ru ral ar eas are not as well serv iced as ur -
ban cen ters by physi cal and so cial in fra struc -
ture such as roads, schools, tele phones, ra dio,
shops, and health clin ics, their ca pac ity to take
ad van tage of mar ket op por tu ni ties is se verely
cur tailed. House holds be long ing to the low est
in come quar tile spend as much as 91 per cent
of their con sump tion budget on food (Fig ure 1).
Even so, be cause their earn ings are so low,
they some times go hun gry.2 As a re sult, the
con se quences of a drop in their earn ings or the 
need to fi nance un ex pected ex pen di tures such
as medi cal ex penses could be quite se ri ous.
The cy cle of bor row ing dur ing ad verse times or
dur ing plant ing sea sons and sav ing or re pay ing 
loans af ter har vest or when earn ings are good
is an in te gral part of the live li hood sys tem of the 
poor. This is evi dent in IFPRI stud ies in Paki -
stan, Mada gas car, and Ne pal. In Ne pal, an
over whelm ing ma jor ity of the poor, about 72
per cent, en gaged in some form of fi nan cial
trans ac tions.  In Mada gas car, nearly half of the
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Bang la desh
Poor Non poor
Cam er oon China Egypt Ghana Mada gas car Ma lawi Ne pal Paki stan
In di ca tor (P) (NP) P NP P NP P NP P NP P NP P NP P NP P NP
Mean house hold size, 
   number of peo ple 5.4 5.0 8.5 6.0 4.8 4.4 7.7 6.2 8.4 6.8 6.8 5.3 5.3 4.0 6.3 7.5 11.2 8.4
Years of edu ca tion of  
 house hold head (per cent)a
    None 73.3 49.3 36.9 33.9 17.1 9.3 56.2 39.2 29.3 20.9 13.0 21.6 30.0 27.0 93.1 93.3 64.2 59.6
    Un der five years 21.3 20.4 52.8 58.8 42.4 42.0 15.0 13.6 10.6 4.6 67.4 53.6 51.0 39.0 2.3 3.7 0.0 0.0
    Five to eight years 3.3 14.2 8.3 8.2 32.5 38.1 12.9 16.1 14.6 7.9 17.4 13.5 18.0 29.0 4.5 2.6 29.0 24.2
    Nine or above 2.0 16.0 0.0 4.2 7.7 10.3 16.0 30.9 45.4 66.9 2.2 11.2 1.0 5.0 0.0 0.6 6.8 16.3
Per cent of house hold heads
  re port ing  self- employed 
  farm ing as prin ci pal  
  oc cu pa tionb 16.0 44.6 69.4 62.0 91.1 81.2 23.4 27.3 76.0 63.0 76.6 81.0 80.0 59.0 n.a. n.a. 42.0 58.1
Mean land own er ship
  (hec tares) 0.2  0.6 2.5 4.3 2.0 2.0 0.4 0.8 2.6 3.4 2.1 3.3 1.5 1.7 0.5 1.5 1.5 4.9
Mean an nual in come per
  house hold mem ber, US$108.6 232.2 179.1 357.2 74.1 204.62 236.3 641.5 82.8 217.2 86.6 223.9 32.7 61.0 90.0 118.5 216.6 407.2
Source: IFPRI re search on ru ral fi nance (see note 1).
Notes: P = poor.  The poor be long to the low est quar tile of in come (or con sump tion ex pen di ture) in their re spec tive coun tries.
NP = non poor.  The non poor are the three other quar ti les.
The time pe ri ods of the sur veys are: Bang la desh, 1994; Cam er oon, 1992; China, 1994; Ghana, 1992–93; Mada gas car, 1992; Ma lawi, 1995; Ne pal, 1991–92; Paki stan, 1986–91;
Egypt, 1997.
n.a. is “not avail able.”
a“House hold head” re fers to the ma jor fam ily la borer.  For years of edu ca tion of house hold head, t e cate gory “none” re fers to the per cent age that are il lit er ate; “un der five years” to those
who had at most some pri mary edu ca tion; “five to eight years” to those who com pleted some jun ior level school; and “nine or above” to those who com pleted some sen ior level school.
bHouse hold heads work ing prin ci pally as daily la borers in ag ri cul ture ac count for an ad di ti n l 37.6 per cent for the poor and 10.1 per cent for the non poor.
Ta ble 1—Se lected house hold char ac ter is tics, by coun try
poor house holds re ported that loans were used 
to cope with house hold emer gen cies when they 
oc curred. In Paki stan, a 1985 ru ral credit sur -
vey con ducted by the gov ern ment of Paki stan
in di cated that nearly 40 per cent of poor house -
holds en gaged in credit trans ac tions.3
The av er age cu mu la tive yearly amount
bor rowed by poor house holds from the for mal 
and in for mal sec tors ranges from about US$4 
in Ma lawi to US$80 in Bang la desh to US$133 
in Cam er oon. The sam ples drawn are not na -
tion ally rep re sen ta tive; with the ex cep tion of
China, Egypt, and Paki stan, they are con cen -
trated in ar eas and in vil lages where for mal fi -
nan cial in sti tu tions are placed. For this rea -
son, re ported lev els of bor row ing are likely to
be higher than na tional av er ages. Nev er the -
less, Fig ure 2 shows that the non poor house -
holds (the up per three quar ti les of house hold
in come) bor row much more than the poor,
with the ex cep tion of Ghana.4 Moreo ver, the
loan amount shown in Fig ure 2 is not avail -
able to the bor rower through out the year, but
only for sev eral weeks or months. This is be -
cause most in for mal loans are given for only
a few days or weeks. Even many for mal
loans ob tained by the sam ple house holds are 
sea sonal loans for ag ri cul ture or ru ral mi cro -
en ter prises. The small est amount bor rowed
is in Ma lawi, a very poor coun try with a rela -
tively in ac tive in for mal credit mar ket.
In for mal lend ers—friends, rela tives,
neigh bors, in for mal groups, or mon ey lend -
ers—pro vide the bulk of the loans in every
coun try ex cept Ghana and Ma lawi (Fig ure 3). 
In Paki stan and Cam er oon, for ex am ple, less 
than 5 per cent of the amount bor rowed by
poor ru ral house holds was ob tained from for -
mal lend ers. In this re port, for mal lend ers
con sist of state and ag ri cul tural de vel op ment
banks and new mi cro fi nance in sti tu tions. The 
lat ter group in cludes credit un ions and co op -
era tives, group- based pro grams run by gov -
ern ment agen cies or non gov ern men tal or -
gani za tions, and vil lage banks. The new
member- based mi cro fi nance in sti tu tions suc -
cess fully reach the poor est in come quar tile in 
Bang la desh and Ma lawi.
The poor ob tain a smaller share of their
loans from the for mal sec tor than the non -
poor in six coun tries (China, Egypt,
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Fig ure 1—Per cent of con sump tion budget
al lo cated to ac quir ing food
Source: IFPRI re search on ru ral fi nance (see note 1).
Fig ure 2—Av er age amount bor rowed from 
for mal and in for mal ru ral fi nan -
cial sec tors per house hold per
year
Source: IFPRI re search on ru ral fi nance (see note 1).
Mada gas car, Ma lawi, Ne pal, and Paki stan),
about the same in one coun try (Cam er oon),
and a larger share in two coun tries (Bang la -
desh and Ghana) (Fig ure 3). Even in a coun -
try like Egypt that has a rela tively dense cov -
er age of for mal fi nan cial in sti tu tions, the role
of in for mal lend ers re mains im por tant. In
Bang la desh, member- based credit pro grams
run by NGOs now play a sig nifi cant role in
pro vid ing credit to the ru ral poor. In Ghana,
the vil lages se lected for the sur vey bene fited
from ru ral banks and NGO- assisted credit
pro grams, the lat ter tar get ing poor female-
 headed house holds.
Fig ure 4 in di cates how house holds spent
their loan money. About one- half to al most
nine- tenths of the loans ob tained from the
for mal and in for mal sec tors com bined went to 
consumption- related pur chases. In Paki stan,
more than 80 per cent was spent on con -
sump tion, food and non food com bined.
Moreo ver, in six out of eight coun tries, with
Ma lawi and Ne pal the ex cep tions, loans for
con sump tion are more im por tant for the
poor est quar tile than for the non poor. In
every coun try, the share of loans used for
con sump tion was higher for in for mal loans
than for for mal loans.5 In Ma lawi, only a small 
share of loans was used for con sump tion be -
cause the Ma lawi Ru ral Fi nance Com pany,
the ma jor ru ral lender, pro vides all loans in
kind in fer til izer and seeds.
Why do more loans fi nance con sump tion
ac tivi ties than pro duc tion or in vest ment ac tivi -
ties? First, the main sup pli ers of credit, in for -
mal lend ers, are gen er ally ill- equipped to fi -
nance sub stan tial, long- term in vest ments
since they rely on their per sonal funds. The
av er age du ra tion of in for mal loan pe ri ods
was, for ex am ple, 86 days in Bang la desh and 
65 in Mada gas car.6 The char ac ter is tics of in -
for mal loans make them more use ful for fi -
nanc ing short- term ac tivi ties such as con -
sump tion sta bi li za tion and pro vid ing work ing
capi tal for off- farm en ter prises. For mal loans,
which are larger in amount and longer in du -
ra tion, are more use ful for fi nanc ing sea sonal 
in puts and in vest ments.
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Figure 3—Share of dif fer ent sources of loans to poor and non poor, by coun try
Source: IFPRI re search on ru ral fi nance (see note 1).
Note:  Green = poor; Black = non poor
Sec ond, in poor house holds the spheres
of con sump tion, pro duc tion, and in vest ment
are not sepa ra ble in the sense that con sump -
tion and nu tri tion are im por tant to a house -
hold’s abil ity to earn in come. If a la borer does 
not have enough to eat, he may be too weak
to work pro duc tively. In gen eral, fam ily la bor
is by far the most im por tant pro duc tion fac tor, 
and the main te nance and en hance ment of la -
bor pro duc tiv ity is cen tral for se cur ing and in -
creas ing in come.
Once mini mum re quire ments for a healthy
and ade quate diet have been met, ad di tional
con sump tion does not gen er ate fur ther in -
creases in la bor pro duc tiv ity. Many view such
ex cess con sump tion as a lux ury and see no so -
cial bene fit in fi nanc ing it through pub licly sup -
ported pro grams. Yet, it is fair to say that luxu ri -
ous or ex ces sive con sump tion is ex tremely rare 
among the ru ral poor. Thus, in con sid er ing poli -
cies for pro vid ing bank ing for the poor, con -
sump tion loans spent mostly on foods needed
to ob tain a bal anced diet or to im prove the
health of fam ily la bor should be seen as
pro duc tive loans be cause the loan en hances
the fam ily’s abil ity to earn.
Bank ers in par ticu lar fre quently ar gue
against con sump tion loans on the grounds
that loans should fi nance ac tivi ties that gen -
er ate in come for re pay ing the loan. In ac tu al -
ity, how ever, the cur rent prac tice of lend ing
only for nar rowly de fined pro duc tive ac tivi ties
sel dom pre vents ru ral house holds from di -
vert ing bor rowed funds from pro duc tion to
con sump tion needs, since lend ers rarely
have the re sources and time to su per vise
loan use.7 Only when loans are given in
kind—in seeds or fer til izer, for ex am ple, in -
stead of cash—do farm ers have dif fi culty in
di vert ing the loan to con sump tion uses. The
data show that the share of loans used for
con sump tion bor rowed from the for mal sec tor 
is lower than the con sump tion share of in for -
mal loans, but it still ranges from 9 per cent in
Ghana to 54 per cent in Ne pal for all house -
holds. The Ne pal study in di cates that bor row -
ers of ten take ad van tage of the fun gi bil ity of
fi nan cial in stru ments to di vert investment- tied 
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Fig ure 4—Stated use of for mal and in for mal loans by the poor and nonpoor, by coun try
Source: IFPRI re search on ru ral fi nance (see note 1).
Note:  Green = poor; Black = non poor
loans to fi nance con sump tion ex pen di tures
that, in the house hold’s own cal cu la tion, of fer 
greater re turns. But just be cause a loan is
used for con sump tion pur poses does not im -
ply that re pay ment will fal ter. Con sump tion
loans in Cam er oon and Mada gas car were
found to have the same or even higher re -
pay ment rates than pro duc tion loans.8 
What about the ade quacy of ru ral fi nan -
cial serv ices? In spite of the vi brant in for -
mal mar kets that can be ob served in many
coun tries, fi nan cial serv ices for the poor
 remain in ade quate.9 In coun tries as di verse
as Bang la desh, Ghana, Mada gas car, Ma lawi,
and Paki stan, ac cess to credit and sav ings
 facilities is se verely lim ited for small farm ers,
ten ants, and en tre pre neurs, par ticu larly
women. A use ful way of ex am in ing house hold
ac cess to fi nan cial mar kets is to ex am ine
credit lim its im posed on them by lend ers.10 In
Bang la desh the me dian for mal credit limit is
$50 and the in for mal limit is $13. The abil ity to
bor row is sig nifi cantly more re stricted in
 Malawi, where the me dian for mal credit limit is 
zero and the in for mal limit is US$3.
Such low credit lim its mean that while
some house holds fre quently are un able to
bor row enough to meet their needs, other
house holds sim ply do not ap ply for a loan at
all be cause of the ex pec ta tion that they will
be de nied. In Mada gas car, for ex am ple,
about 50 per cent of loan ap pli cants re ceived
less than they asked for or noth ing from for -
mal and in for mal lend ers alike.11 In Ghana,
Mada gas car, and Paki stan, IFPRI stud ies
show that a sig nifi cant pro por tion of the poor
who do not ap ply for loans are dis cour aged
from ap ply ing by the strict col lat eral re quire -
ments and high trans ac tion costs fre quently
in volved in do ing busi ness with for mal in sti tu -
tions. There is some varia tion in the per cent -
age of dis cour aged non bor row ers by coun try; 
it is high est in Ghana and low est in Mada gas -
car (Fig ure 5). Given such wide spread
credit- rationing, it is en tirely pos si ble that
even house holds with av er age an nual in -
comes above the pov erty line may not be
able to avoid tran si tory food in se cu rity when
faced with an ad verse shock such as a bad
har vest or se ri ous ill ness of a fam ily mem ber.
While these fig ures de scribe the ex tent of 
in ade quate ac cess to credit, one must not as -
sume that all house holds who do not bor row
lack ac cess to credit. In fact, Fig ure 5 shows
that the share of vol un tary non bor row ers
ranges from 11 per cent in Ghana to nearly 59 
per cent in Mada gas car. Among the most im -
por tant rea sons cited for not bor row ing were
ade quate li quid ity within the house hold, lack
of prof it able in vest ment op por tu ni ties that
could carry the cost of the loan, and in abil ity
or un will ing ness to carry the risks of
in debt ed ness.
Three im por tant im pli ca tions may be
drawn from the in for ma tion pre sented here
about cli ents:
• A sig nifi cant number of poor house -
holds in de vel op ing coun tries ex pe ri -
ence real con straints in the fi nan cial
mar ket in the sense that they are un -
able to bor row as much as they would
like at the pre vail ing trans ac tion terms.
Given that most of the poor at tempt to
bor row in or der to fi nance con sump tion
of food and other ba sic goods that en -
hance health and la bor pro duc tiv ity,
such con straints may force poor house -
holds to eat less food or cheaper foods
with lower nu tri tional value. Also, when
con sump tion lev els are al ready pre cari -
ously low, they may be forced to can cel
or post pone prof it able in vest ments or
sell off as sets—some times at a sub -
stan tial loss—to meet ir re duci ble con -
sump tion needs. This may lead to
greater im pov er ish ment in the long run.
• Be cause the cost of fail ure can be very
high at ex tremely low in comes, poor
house holds are likely to be par ticu larly
risk averse and sen si tive about the
kinds of proj ects that they choose for
 financing. Ac cess to credit and sav ings
op tions may en hance their ca pac ity to
bear risks and there fore in di rectly fos ter 
tech nol ogy adop tion and as set
ac cu mu la tion.
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• Poor house holds in Af rica and Asia
face com plex, mul ti ple con straints on
earn ing op por tu ni ties. They of ten lack
edu ca tion, mar kets, and other es sen -
tial serv ices. Hence, the im pact of fi -
nan cial serv ices on wel fare is likely to
vary with ac ces si bil ity to
com ple men tary in puts such as ir ri ga -
tion, edu ca tion, and mar ket serv ices.
In some en vi ron ments or for some so -
cio eco nomic groups, ac cess to mi cro -
fi nance may do no good, while in
other re gions or for other groups, it
can make an im por tant dif fer ence.
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Fig ure 5—Self- reported rea son for house holds not borrowing, by coun try
Source: IFPRI re search on ru ral fi nance (see note 1).
Percent
COMMITTING PUBLIC RESOURCES 
TO RURAL FINANCE
Poli cy mak ers, ad vis ers, and man ag ershave not reached con sen sus about how
gov ern ments should in ter vene in and regu -
late the ru ral fi nan cial sec tor. Some ar gue
that a mi cro fi nance in sti tu tion should be a
purely fi nan cial in sti tu tion, func tion ing un der
the prin ci ple of full cost re cov ery. Per form -
ance should be meas ured not just by the ex -
tent to which cur rent costs are fully re cov -
ered, but also by the cost re cov ery that would 
have taken place had all types of sub si dies
been elimi nated. Only then, they say, is there 
any pros pect for sus tain ing these serv ices
over the long run, when sub si dized funds
from do nors and gov ern ments have dried up. 
If the poor are un able to make prof it able use
of fi nan cial serv ices priced at full cost, then
these serv ices ought not be used as in stru -
ments for pov erty al le via tion. This line of ar -
gu ment im plies that pub lic re sources could
be bet ter used in other pov erty al le via tion ac -
tivi ties, since well- run fi nan cial in sti tu tions
should be able to serv ice the poor and main -
tain ade quate fi nan cial re turns. Banco Sol in
Bo livia and the vil lage banks (Unit Desa) of
the Bankya Rak yat In do ne sia (BRI) are of ten
cited as good ex am ples.
But this kind of ad vice clashes with real
world ex pe ri ence where most mi cro fi nance
in sti tu tions that serve the poor, in clud ing
well- known ones such as the Bang la desh Ru -
ral Ad vance ment Com mit tee (BRAC) and the
Gra meen Bank in Bang la desh, de pend on
sub si dies from na tional gov ern ments and in -
ter na tional do nors.12 The ar gu ments for com -
mit ting pub lic re sources to ru ral fi nan cial in -
sti tu tions are made on two grounds: mar ket
fail ure and pov erty al le via tion.
Mar ket Fail ure and In sti tu tional
In no va tions
In the past, the de vel op ment and spread of fi -
nan cial in sti tu tions were sup pressed by ex -
ces sive state in ter fer ence, such as rigid ex -
change rate regu la tions and caps on in ter est
rates. To day, it is widely rec og nized that the
ba sic roles of gov ern ment are to es tab lish
mac roeconomic sta bil ity; to en sure that fi nan -
cial mar kets are free to re spond to eco nomic
in cen tives, while fol low ing pru den tial bank ing
prac tices; and to main tain and en force a le gal 
frame work that en sures con tract com pli ance.
How ever, while a lib er al ized fi nan cial mar ket
is a nec es sary con di tion for im prov ing the
sup ply of fi nan cial serv ices to the poor, it is
not suf fi cient in it self. Mar ket lib er ali za tion
alone has not been able to trig ger in no va tion
in new fi nan cial in stru ments that re duce
trans ac tion costs for the poor.13 This is be -
cause ru ral fi nan cial mar kets of de vel op ing
coun tries have in her ent prob lems that make
in vest ments risky and costly.14
• Cli ents are too scat tered geo graphi -
cally, mak ing serv ice de liv ery
ex pen sive.
• Since most of the cli ents de rive their in -
comes from ag ri cul ture, they all tend to
want to bor row at the same time, say in
the pre har vest sea son, and to save im -
me di ately af ter the har vest. This makes
it dif fi cult for the fi nan cial in sti tu tions to
di ver sify their port fo lios.
• In for ma tion about po ten tial bor row ers is 
dif fi cult to ob tain, es pe cially when they
are scat tered, mak ing loan ap pli ca tions
costly to evalu ate.
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• The poor own few as sets, mak ing it in -
fea si ble for the fi nan cial in sti tu tion to
se cure its lend ing with col lat eral.
Typi cally the lender must spend time and
re sources on as sess ing the cred it wor thi ness
of the loan ap pli cant and seek al ter na tive
forms of col lat eral. Given tra di tional tech -
niques of lend ing, these costs of ten prove ex -
ces sive. As a re sult, com mer cial banks shy
away from ru ral cli ents al to gether, lim it ing
their serv ices to the ur ban or pe ri ur ban econ -
omy, where in for ma tion on pro spec tive bor -
row ers is less costly to ob tain and trans ac tion 
vol umes are larger. There is lit tle evi dence,
as yet, that fi nan cial in sti tu tions in the pri vate
sec tor are will ing to in vest re sources to de -
vise prof it able sav ings and loan serv ices for
the ru ral poor.15
Im prove ments in lit er acy, house hold in -
comes, com mu ni ca tion in fra struc ture, ad -
vances in bank ing tech nol ogy and tele com -
mu ni ca tions, and fi nan cial sec tor re form are
likely to de crease trans ac tion costs in the fu -
ture. While it may be best for pri vate banks to 
wait un til con di tions for in vest ment are fa vor -
able, wait ing may not be the op ti mal gov ern -
ment pol icy. In sti tu tional in no va tions that re -
duce the cost of serv ice de liv ery and im prove 
its use ful ness for the poor are es sen tial for
en hanc ing the ef fi ciency and long- run sus -
tain abil ity of ru ral fi nan cial pro grams. This
pro vides a strong rea son for di rect ing pub lic
re sources to ward poli cies that gen er ate in sti -
tu tional in no va tions in the ru ral fi nan cial sec -
tor. There will be even more pay offs if these
in no va tions, which are in the na ture of pub lic
goods, are even tu ally adopted by pri vate sec -
tor fi nan cial in sti tu tions to prof ita bly pro vide
serv ices to the poor.
Ru ral Fi nan cial In sti tu tions and Pov erty
Al le via tion
The sec ond ar gu ment for com mit ting pub lic
re sources to ru ral fi nan cial in sti tu tions is that
pro vi sion of fi nan cial serv ices is a po tent tool
for pov erty al le via tion, and pub lic re sources
are called for to de liver these serv ices to the
poor.16 In sti tu tions such as the Gra meen
Bank or the Ma lawi Mudzi Fund re ceive a sig -
nifi cant amount of pub lic re sources. Their cli -
ents are much poorer than the cli ents of
Banco Sol or the BRI, and it is likely that the
poor est of them would be left out if they had
to pay for serv ices at full mar ket prices.
Man ag ers of mi cro fi nance in sti tu tions in
Asia and Af rica of ten find that pro vid ing fi nan -
cial serv ices to the poor is not enough to at -
tract the poor est cli ents be cause of the many
con straints they face. Credit may of fer low re -
turns to in vest ment for house holds that own
tiny plots of unir ri gated land of low pro duc tiv -
ity, es pe cially when they are il lit er ate, in ill
health, or lack ing ex pe ri ence in high- yielding
agro tech nol ogy or non farm mi cro en ter prises.
For these rea sons, in sti tu tions such as Free -
dom from Hun ger in Ghana and BRAC and
the Gra meen Bank in Bang la desh of fer fi nan -
cial serv ices in com bi na tion with other com -
ple men tary serv ices, such as ba sic lit er acy
pro grams, train ing in en ter prise man age -
ment, and edu ca tion in nu tri tion, health, and
fam ily plan ning that are likely to in crease the
pro duc tiv ity of the loans pro vided.
What then is the case for al lo cat ing pub lic 
re sources to ru ral fi nan cial in sti tu tions for
pov erty al le via tion? Is there a case for com -
bin ing credit serv ices with other kinds of serv -
ices? Are these hy brid pro grams more ef fec -
tive in re duc ing pov erty than mini mal ist credit 
pro grams? The an swers de pend on the po -
ten tial im pact of fi nan cial serv ices on pov erty
and how they com pare with other means of
re duc ing pov erty. Clearly, if an ad di tional dol -
lar spent on a credit- based pro gram re duces
pov erty by a greater amount than a dol lar
spent on an other pov erty re duc tion pro gram,
then there is a case for re di rect ing re sources
to credit- based pro grams. Meas ur ing the ef -
fects of these pro grams on pov erty al le via tion 
is there fore an im por tant step to ward bet ter
in formed de ci sions. But mak ing im pact as -
sess ments is by no means straight for ward,
since a host of other fac tors that af fect pov -
erty have to be care fully con trolled for. This is 
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es pe cially dif fi cult in the case of hy brid pro -
grams where dis en tan gling pro gram credit ef -
fects from non credit ef fects can it self be
daunt ing. None the less, re cent years have
wit nessed a number of re search un der tak ings 
that have made prog ress to ward meas ur ing
im pact (Box 1).
The re sults from IFPRI's own re search
pro gram also point to gen erally (but not uni -
form) posi tive ef fects of credit on in come,
tech nol ogy adop tion, and food con sump tion
(Ta ble 2).17 House holds with im proved ac -
cess to credit are bet ter able to adopt tech -
nol ogy, in crease their in comes, and im prove
food ex pen di tures and calo rie in take than
those who do not have ac cess to credit. How -
ever, the ef fects on nu tri tional status, an im -
por tant in di ca tor of pov erty, are not clear.
Ac cess to credit or par tici pa tion in a for -
mal credit pro gram posi tively af fected house -
hold in come in four of the five coun tries
where such an as sess ment was made. The
study in Ma lawi, how ever, did not in di cate
such an im pact, pos si bly be cause the Ma lawi 
sur vey co in cided with an ex cep tion ally bad
har vest year due to in ade quate rain fall. Stud -
ies in Mada gas car and Paki stan, which spe -
cifi cally ex am ined the ef fects on in put use,
con cluded that im proved ac cess to credit in -
creases the use of ag ri cul tural in puts, es pe -
cially fer til izer and im proved seed. In three
out of four coun tries, credit ac cess had a
posi tive ef fect on to tal food ex pen di tures
(Bang la desh, China, and Paki stan). Credit
was also found to re duce con sump tion vari -
abil ity in Bang la desh and Ne pal. The ef fect
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Box 1
EVI DENCE ON IMPACT
Re cent evi dence in di cates that loans from well- managed and in no va tive ru ral fi nan -cial in sti tu tions, far from be ing one- shot in come trans fers, have helped poor fami lies 
make per ma nent posi tive changes in the qual ity of their lives.
• In Bang la desh, BRAC has had sig nifi cant posi tive ef fects on school en roll ment,
 asset hold ings of house holds, and food con sump tion.18
• Also in Bang la desh, house hold par tici pa tion in credit mar kets has smoothed fluc -
tua tions in the weights of pre school chil dren. Growth pat terns of chil dren in
landless house holds were in flu enced by credit mar ket im per fec tions.19
• A study of the ef fects of bor row ing con straints on the tim ing of hu man capi tal
 investments in Peru shows that if par ents are credit- constrained and a child could
work for wages, par ents are likely to with draw the child from school in or der to
smooth con sump tion.20
• In Kenya, credit ac cess con trib utes to in creased ex pen di ture on edu ca tion.21
• Credit ac cess pro vided by both the Gra meen Bank and BRAC in Bang la desh had a 
posi tive im pact on women's em pow er ment and con tra cep tive use.22
• In Ghana, the com bi na tion of credit with edu ca tion serv ices in women's groups
 resulted in higher off- farm in come from mi cro en ter prises, im proved house hold food 
se cu rity, and im proved nu tri tional status of chil dren.23
on calo rie in take, on the other hand, was not
sig nifi cant in two of the five. No re la tion ship
be tween the nu tri tional status of chil dren and
ac cess to a credit pro gram was found in any
of the coun try stud ies, proba bly be cause
good nu tri tion is the prod uct of a com plex in -
ter ac tion be tween food in take and other fac -
tors such as ac cess to safe wa ter and
sani ta tion, ac cess to health serv ices, and nu -
tri tional knowl edge of care giv ers.
Cur rent evi dence there fore in di cates that, 
over all, the ef fects of credit pro grams on wel -
fare can be sig nifi cant un der many but not all
cir cum stances. What needs more evalua tion
in the fu ture are the pro gram costs in curred
and the re sult ing ra tios of bene fits to costs.24
INFORMAL MARKETS: WHAT LESSONS 
CAN WE LEARN FROM THEM?
In most de vel op ing coun tries, it is the pri -vate, in for mal mar kets that the ru ral poor
turn to for their fi nan cial needs. Why have
these in sti tu tions suc ceeded in pro vid ing
serv ices to the poor when for mal in sti tu tions
have not? What are their ba sic limi ta tions?
The an swers may in di cate im por tant di rec -
tions that pub lic pol icy should take in en cour -
ag ing in sti tu tional in no va tions.25
Typi cally, in for mal in sti tu tions can be
cate go rized as fol lows:
• Lend ing and bor row ing among rela -
tives, friends, and neigh bors. Bor row -
ing from so cially close lend ers is of ten
the first re course of poor house holds in
fi nanc ing ex penses, es pe cially es sen tial 
con sump tion ex pen di tures. Trans ac -
tions are collateral- free and, as the
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Ta ble 2—A sum mary of posi tive or nega tive ef fects of credit ac cess on wel fare, by coun try
In di ca tor of wel fare
 out comes
Ob served Im pact of credit pro grams
Bang la desh Cam er oon China Mada gas car Ma lawi Ne pal Paki stan
House hold in come level + + + + ? n.a. n.a.
Tech nol ogy adop tion n.a. n.a. n.a. + ? n.a. +
To tal food ex pen di ture + n.a. + n.a. ? n.a. +
To tal calo rie in takea + ? + + ? n.a. n.a.
Nu tri tional status of
 chil drenb ? ? n.a. ? ? n.a. n.a.
Con sump tion vari abil ity – n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. – n.a.
Source: Economet ric re sults are pre sented in in di vid ual coun try re ports and other pub li ca tions listed in note 1.
Note: A plus or mi nus sign in di cates posi tive or nega tive im pact sta tis ti cally sig nifi cant at the 10 per cent level. A ques tion mark means
that the ef fect was not sta tis ti cally sig nifi cant. n.a. in di cates that an es ti mate was not vail able.
aNo sig nifi cant ef fect on ca loric in take was found, but 75 per cent of the house holds al ready met at least 80 per cent of to tal ca loric
re quire ments.
bRe gres sions were run sepa rately for each ma jor type of credit pro gram. One credit pro gram showed posi tive ef fects on pre schooler
height- for- age. The re sults for two other pro grams were not sig nifi cant.
IFPRI coun try stud ies show, in ter est is
usu ally not charged.26 These are es -
sen tially in for mal so cial in sur ance
schemes that have the prin ci ple of reci -
proc ity at the core of the trans ac tions.27
Hence, both the lender and the bor -
rower gain from the trans ac tion, and the 
pro cess is self- sustaining. The bor rower 
is able to fi nance ur gently needed ex -
pen di tures quickly and with few trans ac -
tion costs; there is no lengthy ap praisal
pro cess, lit tle or no pa per work or travel 
time, and the terms of trans ac tions are
easy to un der stand. The lender gains a
right to reci proc ity that he can lay claim
to in the fu ture. Fur ther, risk of a loan
not be ing re cov ered is mini mal be cause 
the lender only lends to per sons who
are part of his or her so cial net work,
within which con tracts can be en forced.
For each part ner, there fore, the long-
 term gains as so ci ated with main tain ing
bor row ing privi leges is greater than the
short- term gain from re neg ing on the
pay back.
• Ro tat ing sav ings and credit as so cia -
tions (ROSCAs ), found in many coun -
tries, are also network- based but ad -
dress dif fer ent needs of their mem bers.
The rules of con duct are more for mal -
ized. These as so cia tions, which may
even op er ate un der a des ig nated man -
ager, pool sav ings from mem bers each
pe riod, and ro tate the re sult ing pot
among them, ac cord ing to vari ous rules
in clud ing ran dom draw ing. The pro cess
is re peated each pe riod un til the last
mem ber re ceives the pot. Un like de -
mand de pos its, once the sav ing is com -
mit ted, it usu ally can not be with drawn
be fore the mem ber’s sched uled turn, al -
though some groups do al low for an
early draw of the pot in an emer gency
situa tion.
• In for mal mon ey lend ers. Typi cally, in -
for mal mon ey lend ers are ap proached
when the amount of credit re quired is
larger or is needed quicker than can be
ob tained from friends and neigh bors.
Mon ey lend ers lend for profit and of ten
charge high in ter est rates. Rates in the
range of 5 to 7 per cent per month are
not un com mon.28 Typi cally, mon ey lend -
ers lend only to house holds about
whom they pos sess ade quate in for ma -
tion. How ever, they may make an ex -
cep tion if pu ni tive ac tions against de -
faulters are fea si ble—if there is physi cal 
col lat eral that can be seized or so cial
col lat eral in the form of com mu nity pres -
sure that can be ex erted when con -
tracts are breached. The in for mal na -
ture of these trans ac tions must be
em pha sized: more of ten than not, these 
sanc tions are not en forced by any le gal
author ity but by the com monly un der -
stood rules of the com mu ni ties
them selves.
• Tied credit. Credit trans ac tions are fre -
quently tied to trans ac tions in land and
la bor mar kets to cir cum vent prob lems of 
in ade quate in for ma tion and lack of as -
sets suit able for col lat eral. Trad ers, for
ex am ple, dis burse credit to farm ers in
ex change for the right to mar ket the
grow ing crop; shop keep ers in crease
sales by pro vid ing credit for food, farm
in puts, and house hold ne ces si ties;
large land hold ers se cure ac cess to la -
bor in the peak sea son in re turn for ear -
lier loan ad vances to la bor ers. In these
types of trans ac tions, the lender also
deals with the bor rower in a non lend ing
ca pac ity and is able to use this re la tion -
ship to screen ap pli cants and en force
con tracts. The grain buyer or the lo cal
sugar mill that ad vances credit to the
farmer, for ex am ple, is rea sona bly as -
sured of re pay ment be cause the loan
can sim ply be de ducted from fu ture
sales of the farm er’s har vest.
• House hold sav ings, un til re cently,
were per haps the most over looked
com po nent of ru ral fi nance. Sav ings
pro vide for the ac cu mu la tion of capi tal,
which, in turn, can gen er ate fu ture
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in come and en able fu ture con sump tion.
How ever, there is now am ple evi dence 
that poor ru ral farm ers save to build a
pre cau tion ary buffer to be used dur ing
lean sea sons or to fi nance un ex pected
ex pen di tures.29 For ex am ple, in Cam -
er oon, 59 per cent of house holds
 reported sav ing for health care or to
meet fam ily ob li ga tions, roughly 30
per cent for edu ca tion and house con -
struc tion, and less than 10 per cent for
ag ri cul tural pro duc tion.30
In gen eral, the in ge nu ity of in for mal lend -
ers and self- help or gani za tions in tai lor ing
sav ings, loan, and in sur ance prod ucts to the
re quire ments of their cli ents or mem bers
makes them in dis pen sa ble in both the ur ban
and ru ral fi nan cial land scape of de vel op ing
coun tries.
In for mal Sys tems Face 
Dis ad van tages as Well
In no va tive and use ful as the in for mal sec tor
may be, it also fre quently runs up against se -
vere con straints.31 In for mal credit mar kets, by 
their very na ture, are seg mented. A “mar ket”
typi cally con sists of a sin gle vil lage com mu -
nity or a so cio eco nomic group within a vil -
lage. And in for mal lend ers sel dom man age
sav ings de pos its. Hence, fi nan cial in ter me -
dia tion in the sense of pro vid ing a com mon
clear ing house for bor row ers and lend ers
does not take place to the full est ex tent pos -
si ble. As a re sult, the sup ply of credit is lim -
ited, re sult ing in ei ther se vere credit ra tion ing
or ex tremely high in ter est rates for some bor -
row ers. 
It is not sur pris ing, there fore, that in all
the stud ies con ducted by IFPRI, in for mal sec -
tor trans ac tions were small, short- term loans
taken in or der to pur chase ur gently needed
goods for house hold con sump tion–es pe cially 
food–or, to a lesser ex tent, in puts such as
seeds and fer til izer. The IFPRI study in Bang -
la desh, for ex am ple, found that in 1994 the
av er age size of a loan in the in for mal sec tor
was about US$15 taken for about three
months. In varia bly, when larger proj ects need 
to be fi nanced, such as a new en ter prise, an
ir ri ga tion pump, or the lease or pur chase of
ag ri cul tural land, peo ple of ten turn to for mal
lend ers. Also, es pe cially in ag ri cul tural re -
gions, droughts or floods af fect both in for mal
lend ers and bor row ers si mul ta ne ously, so a
credit sup ply crunch is likely to take place just 
when the de mand for credit peaks. For mal in -
sti tu tions such as banks usu ally have a net -
work of branches across dif fer ent re gions of
a coun try and are there fore in a bet ter po si -
tion to di ver sify risks. And when they are
 allowed to col lect sav ings de pos its, they
serve the needs of sav ers as well as bor row -
ers. For mal in sti tu tions can also lev er age
funds in other fi nan cial mar kets such as the
bond mar ket.
Les sons from In for mal Sys tems
A number of les sons can be de rived from the
work ings of the in for mal sys tem:
• Credi ble long- term part ner ship. That
the ac cu mu lated bene fits as so ci ated
with con tin ued long- term trans ac tions
are larger than the short- term gains as -
so ci ated with de lin quent be hav ior is
what makes in for mal loan con tracts en -
force able. For mal in sti tu tions, simi larly,
must suc cess fully dem on strate to cli -
ents that they ex pect to be in busi ness
for a long time. This dem on stra tion of
sta bil ity is es sen tial for main tain ing high 
re pay ment rates. Cli ents are usu ally as -
tute in mak ing in fer ences about the per -
ma nence of new proj ects. Short- term
and spo radi cally im ple mented credit
proj ects gen er ally en coun ter higher
rates of loan de lin quency pre cisely be -
cause the short- run gains from de fault -
ing out weigh un cer tain fu ture gains.
• Tai lor ing fi nan cial serv ices to
 specific de mand pat terns. As with the
mar ket ing of any prod uct, fi nan cial serv -
ices must be sculpted to fit the spe cific
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de mands of the bor row ers or sav ers.
For the poor, the privi lege of bor row ing
from vari ous in for mal in sti tu tions is
worth pre serv ing pre cisely be cause
their serv ices are re spon sive to the
house holds’ needs. Emer gency loans,
for ex am ple, can be ob tained im me di -
ately on de mand; the re pay ment struc -
ture is closely linked to lo cal pro duc tion
cy cles as so ci ated with the bor row er’s
oc cu pa tion; and loans can be re ne go ti -
ated, tak ing into ac count both the len -
der’s and the bor row er’s spe cific cir -
cum stances. These at trib utes greatly
in crease the value of loans to bor row ers 
and pro vide fur ther in cen tive for them to 
re tain bor row ing privi leges.
On the other hand, when terms of
loans are in com pati ble with lo cal pro -
duc tion pat terns or when loans are tied
to ac tivi ties that, given the struc ture of
lo cal re sources, yield poor re turns, lit tle
is gained by re tain ing bor row ing privi -
leges. Bene fits from de fault ing may out -
weigh the re ten tion of bor row ing privi -
leges. For ex am ple, ag ri cul tural credit
pro grams fre quently pro vide credit for
spe cific farm en ter prises, usu ally ex port
crops or main food sta ples. The loan,
most of ten for seeds and fer til izer, is fre -
quently pro vided in- kind, and the
amount loaned is closely tied to the
area de voted to the crop. Thus, im prov -
ing the credit line or us ing the loan to fi -
nance other re mu nera tive ac tivi ties is
not pos si ble. This re duces the flexi bil ity
of the farm house hold in mak ing the
best use of the loan. Un der these con di -
tions, the farmer may be bet ter off de -
fault ing and in vest ing the loan amount
else where.
• Knowl edge of the lo cal econ omy is
im por tant; there fore, de ci sion mak ing 
should also be made at the lo cal
level. The ways in which in for mal
agents suc cess fully in ter link fi nan cial
trans ac tions with trans ac tions in the
mar kets for land, pro duce, and la bor
pro vides yet an other ex am ple of how fi -
nan cial prod ucts can be tai lored to cli -
ents’ re quire ments. To do this re quires
in ti mate knowl edge of the struc ture of
the lo cal econ omy as well as knowl edge 
of ex ist ing in sti tu tional ar range ments
that can po ten tially be used to
strengthen con tract en force ment. Gen -
er ally this is not pos si ble within a top-
 down or gan iza tional frame work. Front -
line man ag ers must be ac tively in volved 
in adapt ing fi nan cial prod ucts to lo cal
in sti tu tional ar range ments.
• Most fi nan cial con tracts are not self-
 enforcing, and ade quate steps must
be taken to en force con tract com pli -
ance. Whereas the ma jor ity of in for mal
fi nan cial con tracts be tween friends and
rela tives are self- enforcing, so cially dis -
tant lend ers de pend on ex plicit (though
not nec es sar ily le gally codi fied) mecha -
nisms to en force re pay ment. Just as
mon ey lend ers must ob tain a man date
from small com mu ni ties to take pu ni tive
ac tions against de faulters, it is also im -
por tant for for mal in sti tu tions to have
clear, im ple men ta ble, and well un der -
stood plans for con tract en force ment
and loan re cov ery be fore lend ing be -
gins. Lack of a credi ble plan only in vites 
de fault.
• Group- based trans ac tions hold
prom ise. The ex is tence of ROSCAS
and net works of friends and rela tives in -
di cate the pos si bil ity of us ing groups in
for mal lend ing and sav ing ac tivi ties. If
groups can be made re spon si ble for
some of the screen ing, moni tor ing, and
en force ment func tions, the risks would
be re duced for for mal “out sider” in sti tu -
tions. Fur ther more, group loans would
be larger in size and less costly to ad -
min is ter. Al though the group- based con -
cept has been widely ap plied in for mal
ru ral fi nan cial sys tems in Asia, Af rica,
and Latin Amer ica, lit tle is known about
the ef fi ciency and out reach of groups,
com pared with other member- based
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in sti tu tions such as credit un ions or vil -
lage banks. Fu ture re search in this area 
is ur gently needed.
• Pro vi sion of sav ings serv ices. The
poor place a high value on sav ings
serv ices, es pe cially when the op tions
pro vided com bine se cu rity of de posit,
value re ten tion, and flexi bil ity in mak ing
sav ings de pos its and with draw als. For
the banks, ru ral sav ings mo bi li za tion
can pro vide rela tively in ex pen sive funds 
for on- lending. The par ticu lar form in
which house hold sav ings are kept is in -
flu enced by re turn, li quid ity, and risk.
When in ves ti gat ing the sav ings be hav -
ior of the food- insecure and poor, the
stan dard defi ni tion of house hold sav -
ings and in vest ment, which fo cuses on
money and physi cal as sets, is too nar -
row.32 It ne glects the po ten tial for sav -
ings to in crease hu man capi tal through
in vest ment in edu ca tion and im proved
nu tri tional and health status of fam ily
mem bers. Such ex pen di tures may not
only in crease the abil ity of peo ple to
earn a liv ing now, but they are likely to
have a bene fi cial ef fect well into the
fu ture.
• A ques tion of in cen tives. Bor row ers
and lend ers in the in for mal mar ket di -
rectly in ter act with each other. This is
not nec es sar ily so in for mal sys tems,
where loan man ag ers may not have the 
same in cen tive to make good loans as
own ers or trus tees of the bank might
have. For ex am ple, in most
government- run in sti tu tions, loan man -
ag ers are not re warded for mak ing good 
loans. There fore, they are less likely to
take suf fi cient care in screen ing cli ents
or in tak ing steps to re cover loans
swiftly. For mal lend ing sys tems should
there fore es tab lish in cen tives that build
on the loan mana ger’s knowl edge of cli -
ents in or der to mini mize fraud and
other prob lems of con tract com pli ance.
PUBLIC POLICY: SUPPORTING
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION 
To reach the ma jor ity of the poor, in sti -tu tional in no va tions are needed that
en able serv ices to be ex panded, while sub -
stan tially re duc ing the trans ac tion costs for
both the fi nan cial in sti tu tions and the cli -
ents. Long- term sup port of in sti tu tional in -
no va tions in the ru ral fi nan cial sec tor may
be the most prom is ing di rec tion for pub lic
pol icy to take. Both gov ern ments and do -
nors must en cour age in sti tu tional in no va -
tion and de vel op ment, not mi cro man age
banks and other or gani za tions, or ini ti ate
short- term proj ects that have no bear ing on 
in sti tu tion build ing.
The In sti tu tional Frame work
In gen eral, trans ac tion costs can be brought
down by im prov ing in fra struc ture such as
roads, schools, and com mu ni ca tions; by ti -
tling prop erty so that it can serve as col lat -
eral; or by im prov ing in sti tu tions.33 While in -
fra struc ture de vel op ment and land ti tling may 
prove po liti cally or eco nomi cally fea si ble only
in the long run, in sti tu tional in no va tions can
be fos tered through pub lic ac tion, through the 
con certed ef forts of do nors, gov ern ments,
non gov ern men tal or gani za tions, com mu ni -
ties, and house holds.
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Suc cess ful out reach re quires in sti tu tional
in no va tions that re duce the risks and costs
as so ci ated with lend ing and de pos it ing small
amounts of money. Many of the trans ac tion
costs arise from the need to ac quire in for ma -
tion about the mar ket part ner. Ob tain ing such 
in for ma tion for small loans can be pro hibi -
tively costly if the bank agent is asked to do
this. Tra di tional bank ing tech niques, such as
judg ing the loan ap pli ca tion based on writ ten
in for ma tion, are ei ther not fea si ble be cause
of il lit er acy or too costly to ad min is ter. Yet, in -
for ma tion about the cred it wor thi ness of a
loan ap pli cant is read ily avail able within the
lo cal com mu nity through neigh bors and other 
peers.34 Such in for ma tion can be ob tained at
less cost if net works or in sti tu tions are based
at the com mu nity level.
While there are sev eral dif fer ent forms
that in sti tu tional in no va tions in ru ral fi nance
can take, all of the in no va tions build on lo -
cally avail able in for ma tion and ex ploit the
cost ad van tage of in for mal moni tor ing and
en force ment sys tems. Within such sys tems,
the func tions of in for ma tion ac qui si tion and
moni tor ing and en force ment of fi nan cial con -
tracts are largely trans ferred from the bank to 
a group of bor row ers and sav ers. The group
mem bers share a com mon in ter est in gain ing 
ac cess to credit and sav ings serv ices, and
they also pos sess enough low- cost in for ma -
tion to ade quately screen each other and ap -
ply sanc tions to those who do not com ply
with the rules. The ma jor dif fer ence be tween
tra di tional and in no va tive bank ing for the
poor is that in tra di tional bank ing, the agent
of a ru ral bank branch di rectly ne go ti ates
sav ings or loan con tracts be tween the re tail
bank ing in sti tu tion and the in di vid ual. In in no -
va tive ap proaches, on the other hand, a lo cal 
in sti tu tion me di ates be tween the bank and
the in di vid ual and as sumes many of the
screen ing, moni tor ing, and en force ment func -
tions that are too dif fi cult or too costly to be
exe cuted by a bank agent.
Yet, dif fer ences in cul ture and so cio eco -
nomic sys tems do not al low for in sti tu tional
blue prints. While the prin ci ple of har ness ing
lo cally avail able in for ma tion and sanc tion ing
and en force ment mecha nisms is cen tral to in -
sti tu tional in no va tions in ru ral fi nance, the
prac ti cal chal lenge lies in find ing how best to
build and adapt these lo cal com mu nity- and
member- based in sti tu tions and to link them
with other in sti tu tions in the for mal bank ing
sys tem. So far, most in sti tu tional in no va tions
in mi cro fi nance have been gen er ated by
NGOs that do not have com mer cial profit as
their prin ci pal ob jec tive. By tak ing fresh ap -
proaches, these new mi cro fi nance in sti tu tions 
have pene trated ru ral fi nan cial mar kets and
serv iced an un der class of bor row ers in a way 
that was uni mag in able some 20 years ago.
In 1988, IFPRI pub lished one of the most
de tailed stud ies then avail able of the in no va -
tions in group- based bank ing in tro duced by
the Gra meen Bank of Bang la desh, which has 
pro vided credit to 2.1 mil lion women in
36,000 vil lages. Since then, IFPRI has ex am -
ined the ex pe ri ences of other in sti tu tions, in -
clud ing member- owned vil lage banks in
Mada gas car; other large- scale, group- based
credit pro grams in Bang la desh and Ma lawi;
and sav ings and credit co op era tives in Cam -
er oon. Ta ble 3 out lines some of the more im -
por tant fea tures of these in sti tu tions. Some
key com mon char ac ter is tics have been in -
stru men tal to the suc cess of most of these
pro grams, and les sons for new pro gram de -
signs can be de rived from them:35
• Sav ings ar range ments are a promi -
nent part of sus tain able fi nan cial pro -
grams for the poor. All of the in no va tive
ru ral fi nance in sti tu tions in Ta ble 3 have 
some type of sav ings scheme. Sav ings
schemes must take into ac count that cli -
ents, es pe cially the poorer ones, are
mo ti vated to save, among other rea -
sons, as a pre cau tion against fu ture
risks. There fore, it is im por tant that
prod ucts be dif fer en ti ated with re spect
to ma tur ity, li quid ity, and re turn to re -
flect this con cern.
• Group ap proaches have shown clear
po ten tial for reach ing poorer par tici -
pants of fi nan cial mar kets, who ei ther
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Ta ble 3—Struc ture of in no va tive ru ral fi nan cial in sti tu tions for the poor: Some ex am ples from Af rica and Asia
In sti tu tion
Per cent of
fe male
mem bers
Mini mum bal ance/
mem ber ship fee
Type of
col lat eral
re quire ment Sub sidi za tion
Cov er ing
ad min is tra tive
costs
Per cent of
loan
re cov ery
Length of
op era tion
Growth
(number of
mem bers)
(years)     
Nonbank rural financial
  institutions
Bangladesh Rural
Advancement 
Committee (BRAC)
80 Mem ber ship in
 a group. Regu lar
 sav ings re quire -
 ment
Group li abil ity,
 frac tion of 
 loan must be 
 de pos ited as
 sav ings
Yes, but 
 moderate. 
 Many donors
Yes 95 to 100, over
 the years
26 121,000 
707,000 (1992)
Over 1 mil lion
  (1998)
Association for Social
Advancement (ASA),
Bangladesh
96 (1997) Same as BRAC Same as BRAC Yes, in new
  donor-supported
  branches
Yes 99.9 (1997) 20 800,000 (1997)
Cooperative Credit Union
League (CamCCUL),
Cameroon
25 One mem bership
 share man da tory
Sav ings de posit
 with lev er age 1:5, 
peer pres sure
Yes, technical
 assistance
Yes 74 (1991) 20 50,000 (1983)
72,000 (1989)
Mutual Assistance 
Credit Groups (MCAGs),
China
Household is
 member
Ad mis sion fee
 ($2 to $20) or
 equiva lent in 
 grain
Sav ings with 
 lev er age 1:4, 
 so cial capi tal 
 as col lat eral
 sub sti tute
Yes, state and
 relief funds
Cov ered mostly
 by mem bers
n.a. Since 1992 About 170,000
 MCAGs na tion -
 wide (1995)
Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCC),
China
n.a. Must buy shares Sav ings, so cial
 capi tal as
 col lat eral
 sub sti tute
Yes, state
 funds
Cov ered mostly
 by mem bers
85 (1994) Since late 1950s.
 Sepa rated from
 Ag ri cul tural
 De vel op ment 
 Bank in 1994
RCC lo cated 
 in 96 per cent 
 of coun ties
Mutual credit and 
savings groups 
(CECAM), 
Madagascar
About 10 Yes, 1-5 times 
 the daily wage
 (de cided by
 mem bers
 them selves)
Sav ings 
 de pos its
 with lev er age
 1:10/so cial 
 capi tal
Yes, by
 international
 donors
Cov ered mostly 
 by mem bers
Above 90 8 Started 1990.
 7,200 mem bers
 in 90 vil lages
 (1997)
Member-Managed 
Village Banks  (AECA) 
in Madagascar 
(also in Cameroon, Mali,
The Gambia)
About 30 Yes, de cided 
 by mem bers
Mem ber/vil lage
soli dar ity.
Vari ous loan
sizes in re la tion
to sav ings
de posit ap plied
(var ies with
vil lage bank)
Yes, technical
assistance (by 
French NGO)
Cov ered by 
mem bers
Close to 100 7 Started 1991.
1,830 mem bers
in 38 vil lage
banks (1997)
Village Development
Funds, Segou, Mali
n.a. No Vil lage sav ings
fund for lend ing,
lev er age 1:10
Establishment
assistance by 
BNDA
n.a., but fi nan cial
suc cess
100 (1988) Start 1984 85 vil lages (1988)
 
Malawi Mudzi Fund
(MMF)/Rural 
Finance Company 
(MRFC), Malawi
n.a. No, but op por tu nity
 costs of time for 
 group train ing/
 for ma tion
Savings with 
leverage ratio
1:10.Social 
capital as
collateral 
substitute
Yes No More than  90; 
during 1990s,
below 90%
12 About 5,000
Promotion of
Micro-entreprises 
for Rural Women
(PMERW),
Credit Program, Malawi
100 No, but must save
 and be trained 
 before any credit 
 is given
Savings, loan
sizes fixed. 
Social capital 
as collateral
substitute
Yes, technical
assistance and 
credit guarantee 
for commercial
bank
No (subsidized) More than 90
(1995)
4 600 (1996)
Banking institutions
  (serving poor clientele)
Grameen Bank,
Bangladesh
90 Membership in a
 group. Regular 
 savings payment
Savings/loans
extended to
groups under 
joint liability, 
fixed loan sizes
Yes, moderate,
through grants
and low-interest
loans from
donors
Yes, in old 
branches, but 
not in new ones
98 (1995) First branch
 office in 1978
58,000 (1985)
250,000 (1986)
660,000 (1990)
2.07 million in
1,055 branches
(1995)
Bankya Rakyat 
Indonesia 
unit network (BRI-UD)
About 25 No Physical
guarantee 
(land, vehicle,
savings), 
therefore do not
reach the poorest
No (Subsidy
Dependency
Index—40%, i.e.
BRI makes profit)
Yes More than 95 Founded in 1970 
(to expand Green 
Revolution) 
between 1970-84 
highly subsidized 
Reorganized
since 1984, 16.2
million depositors 
and 2.5 million
borrowers in
3,512 units
Note:  n.a. means not avail able
do not pos sess suit able col lat eral or
who can not pro vide such col lat eral at
rea son able trans ac tion costs for the
lender. Most schemes make mem bers
jointly li able for the re pay ment of loans
and give sub se quent credit only if the
group has fully re paid. The threat of los -
ing ac cess to fu ture credit ex erts pres -
sure on mem bers to per form vari ous
tasks, in clud ing screen ing of loan ap pli -
cants, moni tor ing the in di vid ual bor row -
ers, and en forc ing re pay ment of their
peers’ loans.
• Demand- oriented fi nan cial serv ices
are es sen tial for wide out reach. The
scope of lend ing serv ices of fered to
ru ral house holds must ad dress not only
pro duc tion- and income- generating ac -
tivi ties but also con sump tion needs
such as health, edu ca tion, and so cial
ob li ga tions. Ru ral fi nan cial in sti tu tions
should also be able to put in place in no -
va tive re fi nanc ing and re pay ment pro -
ce dures that are flexi ble enough to ac -
com mo date un an tici pated events
af fect ing a house hold. This may re quire 
un bu reau cratic ac cess to emer gency
loans or the buildup of emer gency
funds by member- based fi nan cial in sti -
tu tions, which could pos si bly be pooled
through a re gional or na tional second-
 tier in sti tu tion.
CONCLUSIONS 
New in no va tive mi cro fi nance in sti tu tionshave shown the po ten tial to reach peo -
ple who live be low the pov erty line. But many 
of the poor est of the poor re main ex cluded.
To in clude this group, in sti tu tions must mar -
ket fi nan cial prod ucts suit able to the poor est
group and re duce other en try bar ri ers faced
by the poor.
IFPRI’s im pact as sess ment stud ies have
mostly fo cused on the short- run ef fects of
credit ac cess on in come, food con sump tion,
and nu tri tion, which are posi tive for in come,
ag ri cul tural tech nol ogy adop tion, and level of
food ex pen di ture and calo rie in take. How -
ever, be cause the poor face so many con -
straints, in some situa tions, in vest ment in
edu ca tion, ex ten sion serv ices, health care,
and im prove ments in in fra struc ture may be
more cost- effective ways of re duc ing pov erty
than pro vi sion of fi nan cial serv ices. But, in
other situa tions, fi nan cial serv ices may have
to be com bined with other serv ices and com -
mu nity ac tion to make them ef fec tive.
Few im pact as sess ment stud ies to date
have at tempted to com pare the so cial bene -
fits at the vil lage, house hold, and in di vid ual
lev els with the so cial costs of sup port ing ex -
pan sion of mi cro fi nance in sti tu tions.36 Re -
search that com pares the over all long- term
ef fects of im proved credit ac cess with pro -
gram costs is ur gently needed.
De spite their suc cess, it would be un wise
to con clude that the new for mat of the mi cro -
fi nance in sti tu tions such as the Gra meen
Bank can sim ply be rep li cated else where.
One les son is be com ing in creas ingly clear:
there is no sin gle blue print for suc cess. Re -
cent ex pe ri ence in di cates that pro grams
should be de signed to har ness a com mu ni -
ty’s par ticu lar strengths—its lo cal re sources,
agroe co logi cal char ac ter is tics, his tori cal and
cul tural ex pe ri ences, and oc cu pa tional pat -
terns—in or der to re duce costs of screen ing
par tici pants, moni tor ing fi nan cial ac tiv ity, and
en forc ing con trac tual ob li ga tions. In sti tu tional 
de sign may vary even for simi lar tar get
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groups within the same coun try. In Bang la -
desh, for ex am ple, the As so cia tion for So cial
Ad vance ment and BRAC pro vide loans to cli -
ents them selves, while Rangpur- Dinajpur Ru -
ral Serv ices forms and trains groups, which
then ob tain ag ri cul tural loans from banks.
De sign ing, ex peri ment ing with, and build -
ing fi nan cial in sti tu tions for the poor re quire
eco nomic re sources and ade quate con sid -
era tion of longer term so cial re turns. Whether 
an in sti tu tional ar range ment that is suited to
lo cal con di tions will also be ac cepted by the
bank ing sec tor can not be known un til it is
tried. Since the mar ket, by it self, has not
been able to stimu late much re search and
ex peri men ta tion, pub lic sup port in the in sti tu -
tional ex peri men ta tion and de vel op ment
phase is criti cal. Once vi able pro to types are
iden ti fied, they will even tu ally be adopted by
the pri vate sec tor.
In the last two dec ades, NGOs have
taken the lead in de vel op ing in no va tive fi nan -
cial in sti tu tions partly be cause the sub si dies
they re ceive from do nors and gov ern ment or -
gani za tions make it fea si ble for them to al lo -
cate re sources to in no va tions. In their in fant
stage, co op era tives, vil lage banks, or groups
are de pend ent on tech ni cal as well as fi nan -
cial as sis tance. For ex am ple, tech ni cal as sis -
tance is needed to train mem bers to read and 
main tain sav ings and loan rec ords; train ing is 
also needed to es tab lish man age ment and
con trol func tions of newly formed groups. Fi -
nan cial as sis tance, on the other hand, sup -
ple ments ini tial sav ings de pos its from cli ents
to pro vide start- up capi tal for lend ing. Only
when these new in sti tu tions prove their cred -
it wor thi ness over a se ries of loan cy cles are
they likely to be ac cepted by com mer cial
banks as vi able part ners. In fact, bank ing
laws may be re quired to ac com mo date, regu -
late, and su per vise new member- based fi -
nan cial in sti tu tions. In do ne sia, for ex am ple,
has un der gone a number of pro ac tive regu la -
tory changes in the fi nan cial sec tor that have
al lowed member- based fi nan cial in sti tu tions
to pro vide sav ings and credit serv ices to
small hold ers and mi cro en tre pre neurs.37
In a broader sense, just as pub lic pol icy
should play a role in pro mot ing tech no logi cal
in no va tions that gen er ate so cial bene fits, it
should also help pro mote in sti tu tional in no va -
tions that as sist the dis ad van taged or ad -
dress in trin sic mar ket fail ures. As poli cy mak -
ers seek to make ra tional pol icy choices, they 
must weigh the so cial costs of de sign ing and
build ing fi nan cial in sti tu tions for the poor
against their so cial bene fits. Well- directed
sup port, in clud ing sub si dies, to prom is ing mi -
cro fi nance in sti tu tions is likely to have pay offs 
in both serv ices to the poor and re duced cost 
of serv ices in the long run. This is a point of
view that those who ar gue for a com plete re -
moval of sub si dies should not ig nore. Of
course, some ex peri ments in in sti tu tional in -
no va tions will suc ceed, while many oth ers
will fail. Pub lic pol icy will need to sup port and
evalu ate this ex peri men ta tion pro cess and
nur ture those de signs or in sti tu tions that hold
prom ise of fu ture suc cess. Gov ern ments, do -
nors, prac ti tio ners, and re search in sti tu tions
must work to gether closely to pin point the
costs, bene fits, and fu ture po ten tial of emerg -
ing fi nan cial in sti tu tions.
In the long run, the pay off to pub lic in vest -
ment in in sti tu tional in no va tions will lie in the
trans for ma tion of now nas cent mi cro fi nance
in sti tu tions into ef fi cient and full- fledged fi -
nan cial in ter me di ar ies that of fer sav ings and
credit serv ices to small hold ers, ten ant farm -
ers, and ru ral en tre pre neurs, thus al le vi at ing
pov erty. Evi dence of this trans for ma tion is al -
ready emerg ing in coun tries such as Bang la -
desh, In do ne sia, and Thai land. The pay off
will also come from the de vel op ment of vi able 
lend ing meth od olo gies that pri vate com mer -
cial banks can read ily adopt to prof ita bly pro -
vide sav ings and loan serv ices to the poor.
Like the de vel op ment of new high- yielding
crop va rie ties in ag ri cul ture, in sti tu tional in no -
va tion gen er ates pub lic goods that can be
read ily used by those who did not con trib ute
to the cost of de vel op ment. The rapid growth
in credit groups within and out side of Bang la -
desh that rep li cate Gra meen Bank prin ci ples
is one ex am ple. Still an other ex am ple is
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found in Latin Amer ica where pri vate com -
mer cial banks have started to adopt group-
 based lend ing meth ods de vel oped and tested 
by non profit or gani za tions that ini tially de -
pended on pub lic sup port. An other ex am ple
is in Kenya where the mi cro fi nance in sti tu tion 
K-REP is now seek ing per mis sion to op er ate
as a bank.
In the fi nal analy sis, judg ing whether such 
in sti tu tional in no va tions—gen er ated by pub lic 
ac tion and through do mes tic or for eign re -
sources—pay off re quires a criti cal look at
the bene fits that im proved ac cess to fi nan cial 
serv ices bring to the poor. It is there fore both
wel come and nec es sary that re cent re search
has in creas ingly ex am ined the im pact of
credit pro grams on in come and em ploy ment
gen era tion, food se cu rity and nu tri tion, and
pov erty al le via tion. With the right com bi na tion 
of pub lic pol icy, pri vate ini tia tive, and ob jec -
tive re search, pub lic in vest ments in fi nan cial
in sti tu tions de signed to serve the poor in ru ral 
ar eas of Af rica, Asia, and Latin Amer ica are
likely to bear fruit as well.
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NOTES
 1. In all coun tries, with the ex cep tion of China, Paki stan, and Egypt, the house hold sam ples
were cho sen from ar eas where for mal fi nan cial in sti tu tions were op er at ing. Hence, they are
not rep re sen ta tive of ar eas that do not bene fit from such serv ices. How ever, they do pro vid
a use ful pic ture of the char ac ter is tics of the poor est com pared with the non poor in the se -
lected ar eas. A sum mary of study coun tries and re lated data sets is pro vided in M. Zel ler, et
al., “Re search Pro posal for IFPRI’s Mul ti coun try Pro ject (MP5) on Ru ral Fi nance Poli cies for
Food Se cu rity for the Poor” (In ter na tional Food Pol icy Re search In sti tute (IFPRI), Wash ing -
ton, D.C., 1994). An ear lier cross- country syn the sis for up to seven case study coun tries is
con tained in M. Zel ler, et al., “Fi nan cial Serv ices for the Ru ral Poor: A Mul ti coun try Syn the sis
and Im pli ca tions for Pol icy and Fu ture Re search,” a fi nal re port to the Ger man Min is try for
Eco nomic Co op era tion and De vel op ment (BMZ) (IFPRI, Wash ing ton, D.C., De cem ber 1996,
pho to copy). De tailed in for ma tion on sam pling and re sults is avail able in the fi nal re ports for
the fol low ing case stud ies. For Bang la desh, see M. Zel ler, M. Sharma, and A. U. Ah med,
“Credit for the Ru ral Poor: Coun try Case Bang la desh,” a fi nal re port sub mit ted to the Ger man
Agency for Tech ni cal Co op era tion (GTZ) (IFPRI, Wash ing ton, D.C., 1996, pho to copy). For
Cam er oon, see G. Schrie der and F. Heid hues, “Credit Poli cies for Food Se cu rity in Sub-
 Saharan Af rica: The Case of Cam er oon,” a fi nal re port sub mit ted to GTZ (IFPRI, Wash ing ton, 
D.C., 1993); G. Schrie der, The Role of Ru ral Fi nance for Food Se cu rity of the Poor in Cam er -
oon (Frank furt, Ger many: Lang Ver lag, 1995). For China, see L. Zhu, Y. Ji ang Zhong, and J.
von Braun, “Credit for the Ru ral Poor in China,” a fi nal re port to GTZ (IFPRI, Wash ing ton,
D.C., 1996, pho to copy); and L. Zhu, Y. Ji ang Zhong, and J. von Braun, C edit Sys tems for
the Ru ral Poor in China (New York: Nova Sci ence Pub lisher, 1997). For Egypt, see M.
Sharma and M. Zel ler, “An Analy sis of House hold Level Credit Trans ac tion in Egypt,” a re port 
pre pared for the U.S. Agency for In ter na tional De vel op ment (USAID) (IFPRI, Wash ing ton,
D.C., March 1998). For Ghana, see E. Ken nedy, E. Pay on gay ong, L. Had dad, T. Tshi baka,
R. Ag ble, and R. Te tebo, “Im pact of Credit Pro grams on Food Se cu rity and Nu tri tion in
Ghana,” a re port to USAID (IFPRI, Wash ing ton, D.C., 1994, pho to copy). For Mada gas car,
see M. Zel ler, “Credit Poli cies for Food Se cu rity in Sub- Saharan Af rica: The Case of Mada -
gas car,” a fi nal re port to GTZ (IFPRI, Wash ing ton, D.C., 1993). For Ma lawi, see A. Di agne,
M. Zel ler, and C. Mataya, “Ru ral Fi nan cial Mar kets and House hold Food Se cu rity: Im pacts of
Ac cess to Credit on the So cio eco nomic Situa tion of Ru ral House holds in Ma lawi,” a fi nal re -
port sub mit ted to the Min is try for Women, Chil dren Af fairs, Com mu nity De vel op ment, and So -
cial Wel fare, Ma lawi (IFPRI and the Uni ver sity of Ma lawi, Wash ing ton, D.C., 1996). For Ne -
pal, see M. Sharma, “Ru ral Credit In sti tu tions and Sub sis tence Con sump tion: An Em piri cal
Study Based on House hold Data from Ne pal” (Ph.D. diss., Cor nell Uni ver sity, Ith aca, N.Y.,
1998). For Paki stan, see S. J. Malik, “Credit Use, Pov erty, and the Role of In sti tu tional Ru ral
Credit: The Case of Paki stan” (IFPRI, Wash ing ton, D.C., 1994, pho to copy).
 2. In ter na tional Food Pol icy Re search In sti tute, A 2020 Vi sion for Food, Ag ri cul ture, and the En -
vi ron ment: The Vi sion, Chal lenge, and Rec om mended Ac tion (Wash ing ton, D.C.: IFPRI,
1995).
 3. Sharma, “Ru ral Credit In sti tu tions and Sub sis tence Con sump tion: Ne pal”; Zel ler, “Credit Poli -
cies for Food Se cu rity in Sub- Saharan Af rica: The Case of Mada gas car”; Malik, “Credit Use,
Pov erty, and the Role of In sti tu tional Ru ral Credit: The Case of Paki stan.”
29
 4. The house hold sam ple in Ghana was drawn from vil lages with credit pro grams that tar geted
rela tively large loans to poor women. The sur vey sam pled many of these pro gram bene fi ci ar -
ies, and the re sults re ported in the fig ure are the sim ple, non weighted sam ple means. All data 
from other case coun tries are weighted av er ages, thus cor rect ing for over sam pling of pro -
gram bene fi ci ar ies in the sur vey vil lages.
 5. Zel ler et al., “Fi nan cial Serv ices for the Ru ral Poor.”
 6. Ibid.
 7. J. D. von Pis chke and D. W. Ad ams, “Fun gi bil ity and the De sign and Evalua tion of Ag ri cul -
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719–726.
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ral ar eas have ac cess to fi nan cial serv ices. See Con sul ta tive Group to As sist the Poor est,
CGAP: A Micro- Finance Pro gram, Fo cus Note No. 1 (World Bank: Wash ing ton, D.C., 1996).
The pic ture for ru ral and par ticu larly ag ri cul tural en tre pre neurs is likely to be worse than for
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